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This paper analyzes the structural change implications of consumer credit expansions in a dual-sector open
economy growth model. Policy-induced increases in banks’ willingness and ability to lend result in new
consumer lending, boosting consumption demand and average wages in the nontradable sector. Under the
assumptions of fixed relative wages and mark-up pricing, wage pressures translate into inflationary pres-
sures. The central bank, acting under the sole target of controlling inflation, raises the interest rate to
contain inflationary pressures. This intervention causes a real exchange rate appreciation, followed by a loss
of international competitiveness in the tradable sector. This way, the model illustrates that consumer credit
expansions can trigger premature deindustrialization, shifting sectoral structure in favor of the nontradable
sector. The formal model is inspired by the Turkish economy that experienced a notable expansion of con-
sumer credit between 2002-2013.
Key Words: Consumer credit, structural change, economic growth, inflation targeting, real exchange rate
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1 Introduction
Over the past 70 years, consumer credit has grown substantially both in developed and developing coun-
tries – especially in the latter (Müller, 2017). However, the implications of rising consumer borrowing for
economic growth have been discussed mostly in relation to developed countries, particularly the US (Mian
& Sufi, 2015). In contrast, the research on the macroeconomic effects of consumer credit expansions in
developing countries has been somewhat limited. Did consumer credit expansions generate high growth
rates in developing countries? If so, was this achieved through improving productive capacities or fueling
unsustainable demand booms? How did consumer credit expansions articulate with the sectoral allocation
of resources? There is a need to address these questions taking into consideration the structural features of
developing countries, where the macroeconomic implications of consumer credit expansions differ by virtue
of the distinct growth challenges faced in these economies.
∗I am especially thankful for Peter Skott’s helpful guidance on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank
Adam Aboobaker, Arslan Razmi, Gerald Epstein, and participants at the Analytical Political Economy Workshop at UMass
Amherst and London School of Economics Workshop on Development Planning for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Any remaining errors are my own.
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While the primary growth obstacle faced by mature economies concerns the insufficiency of aggregate de-
mand, the growth challenge faced by dual economies is more akin to a structural transformation problem
(Aboobaker & Ugurlu, 2020; Skott, 2021). Therefore, in mature economies, consumer credit expansions
can prove to be effective in stimulating economic growth by fueling domestic demand, notwithstanding its
adverse distributional and financial stability implications. In contrast, in dual economies, large expansions in
consumer credit can have detrimental consequences if it causes macroeconomic imbalances, such as exchange
rate overvaluation or trade imbalances, or deteriorates the sectoral structure by expanding the nontradable
sector at the expense of the tradable sector. The gaps in our knowledge on these issues beget a need to
examine the structural change implications of consumer credit expansions in dual economies.
This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of consumer credit
expansions in a two-sector open economy growth model. The model features an inflation-targeting cen-
tral bank and credit-constrained worker consumers. The expansions in consumer lending are explained by
changes in banks’ willingness and ability to lend. The model illustrates that consumer credit expansions
of this type can generate premature deindustrialization, whereby low productivity sectors, often associated
with the production of nontradable goods, dominate the sectoral structure before the economy goes through
a sufficient experience of industrialization (Rodrik, 2016).
The growth of consumer lending in developing countries can best be interpreted in the context of the ad-
herence to the so-called (post) Washington Consensus policies from the late 1970s onward. The Washington
Consensus, propagated by key Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, juxtaposed a set
of economic policies and institutional transformations that already held sway in developed countries. These
included fiscal discipline, inflation-targeting, flexible exchange rate system, privatization of state-owned en-
terprises, and rolling back of welfare state (Fine et al., 2003).
The transformation of policy making under these imperatives has significantly limited the room of developing
countries to carry out expansionary fiscal and monetary policies1. While possibilities to expand domestic
demand through these conventional means were being constrained by this new hegemonic agenda, new
opportunities emerged to stimulate domestic demand through credit-financed consumption. Consumer in-
debtedness has been consistently encouraged through policy changes at the national and international levels
(Dos Santos, 2013, p. 325). The expansion of consumer credit did not only provide an expedient solution
to the inability to boost economic activity through expansionary policies, but it also provided governments
means of mediating distributional tensions aggravated by the Washington Consensus model of economic
management. By delinking domestic demand generation from wage growth, consumer borrowing provided a
way of stimulating demand without challenging the distributive interests of the capitalist class. The working
class, on the other hand, was at least partly compensated for any decline in their purchasing power stemming
1Here and in several other parts of the paper, I comment on developing country governments’ decreased ability to undertake
expansionary fiscal and monetary policy in a descriptive manner. Even if these countries’ ability to engage in expansionary
aggregate demand policies was not constrained, the desirability of aggregate demand stimulus is questionable in dual economies
from the perspective of long-term structural transformation. While expansionary policies may be needed for short-run stabi-
lization, sustained aggregate demand stimulus is likely to be incompatible with industrialization targets. See Aboobaker and
Ugurlu (2020) and Skott (2021) for further elaborations on this argument.
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from the implementation of Washington Consensus policies through increased borrowing opportunities, while
income was being redistributed from the working to the rentier class through interest payments on consumer
debt (Hein, 2012). However, although credit-financed consumption was instrumental in fueling economic
growth in the short-run while mediating class conflict, it was less successful with respect to structural trans-
formation imperatives.
Turkey is a great exemplar of a developing country that experienced a substantial growth of consumer credit
in recent decades with adverse effects on macroeconomic balances and the sectoral structure. The formal
model developed in this paper is inspired by the developments in the Turkish economy during the period
2001-2018. However, the paper offers implications for a broader set of developing countries that have gone
through similar experiences, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Gabor, 2010; Garber et al.,
2019; IMF, 2006).
Turkey entered the 21st century with a major economic crisis in 2001, followed by an IMF-supported dis-
inflation program named “Transition to a Strong Economy” (TSE). In compliance with this program, the
economic management committed to implementing a set of standard Washington Consensus policies, with
an emphasis on fiscal discipline and restructuring of the banking sector. This program was fully adopted by
the subsequent AKP 2 governments. Being bound by primary fiscal surplus targets and lack of an industrial
strategy to stimulate exports or investment, the TSE program left limited scope for AKP governments to
boost economic activity. In subsequent years, the rise in consumer credit functioned towards filling this
vacuum. The strategic importance assigned to the construction sector by the AKP amplified the functional
importance of consumer credit markets even further. In effect, the TSE program has sown the seeds of a
consumer credit-driven growth model.
Besides assigning a functional role to consumer credit expansions regarding fueling domestic demand, the
TSE program also enabled and encouraged the banking sector to increase consumer lending through the
fiscal and banking reforms it introduced. Throughout the 1990s, commercial banks were investing heavily
in high-yielding government debt instruments (with an average real interest rate on government securities
of around 30 percent) and subsequently providing too little credit to the private sector at high interest
rates and crowding out real investment (Bakir & Öniş, 2010). Therefore, the TSE program was formulated
based on the understanding that reducing the government deficit, lowering interest rates on government
debt instruments through a disinflationary program, and restricting the purchase of Treasury securities by
commercial banks would crowd-in investment by encouraging commercial banks to lend to the corporate
sector. However, in the context of cheap borrowing opportunities in the international markets, supported by
the inflation-targeting framework that tolerated real exchange rate appreciations due to its role in controlling
inflation (Benlialper & Cömert, 2016), large corporations decreased their reliance on the domestic banking
sector. The end of an era of profiting off high interest rates on Treasury securities accompanied by lower
demand for domestic bank credit from large corporations encouraged commercial banks to find new profit
generation sources (Karaçimen, 2014). It was in this context that consumer credit provision became a vital
business strategy for the Turkish banking sector. The end result of these developments was a remarkable
2AKP is the Turkish acronym for Justice and Development Party that has been in a single-party government since 2002.
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increase in the consumer credit to GDP ratio (figure 3).
Although consumer credit growth supported high GDP growth rates through stimulating consumption expen-
ditures, particularly between 2003-2007, a period referred to as the “Tulip Era”3, this period was much less
successful judged by other key indicators, such as stagnating investment rates, an overvalued currency, sus-
tained and deteriorating current account deficits, and shifts in the sectoral structure favoring low-productivity
sectors. While several illuminating descriptive accounts highlighted the weaknesses of Turkey’s post-2001
growth experience (see Orhangazi and Yeldan (2021) as the most recent example), there have not been many
attempts to illustrate the potential mechanisms through which consumer credit expansions played a role in
generating these detrimental outcomes, particularly with respect to the sectoral structure.
The contributions of this paper are hence two-fold: 1) to develop a two-sector growth model that illustrate
the complex macroeconomic mechanisms through which consumer credit expansions can impede structural
change when borrowing constraints that consumers were hitherto subjected to are lifted, and an inflation-
targeting regime is in place 2) and by way of this, to critically evaluate the short-termism of growth strategies
various developing countries, like Turkey, adopted during the 2000s.
The mechanism by which consumer credit expansions undermine structural transformation can be summa-
rized as follows. In the model, incomes in the nontradable sector are demand determined. Consumer credit
expansion boosts consumption demand and, related to this, the average incomes (wages) in the nontradable
sector. Under the assumptions of fixed relative wages across the two sectors and fixed mark-up pricing, wage
pressures translate into inflationary pressures. The central bank, acting under the sole target of controlling
inflation, raises the interest rate to contain domestic price increases. However, this intervention causes the
real exchange rate to appreciate, followed by a loss of international competitiveness of the tradable sector.
The resulting displacement of labor away from the tradable towards the nontradable sector negatively affect
long-run growth prospects, given the differences in labor productivity between the two sectors.
It should be noted at the outset that the model developed in this paper shares some affinities with the
three-sector model developed by Martins and Skott (2021), which addresses the inflationary effects of com-
modity price booms. In Martins and Skott’s paper, a boom in commodity prices creates wage pressures
and inflationary tendencies, to which the inflation-targeting central bank responds by raising the interest
rate, generating a real exchange rate appreciation. The subsequent fall in the tradable sector profitability
generates deindustrialization. The model presented in this paper is similar to that of Martins and Skott
insofar as both papers feature i) a temporary boom to domestic demand, ii) inflationary tendencies linked to
relative wage structure, and iii) inflation-targeting central bank. However, the papers also differ in few criti-
cal ways. Most importantly, they analyze different sources of expansion to domestic demand. While a boom
3The ‘Tulip Era’ historically refers to the period between 1718-1730 during which the ruling classes in the Ottoman Empire
enjoyed “extravagance, conspicuous consumption, and cultural borrowings from both East and West.” (cited in Kurt, 2020, p. 4).
Turkey’s leading Marxist economist Korkut Boratav refers to the 2003-2007 period, during which the first AKP government
was in power, as the “Tulip Era” (Boratav, 2018), given that the government’s macroeconomic management during this period
has often been praised uncritically and out of proportion by liberal commentators and mainstream economists (e.g., Acemoglu
and Ucer, 2015).
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in commodity prices expands domestic demand in Martins and Skott, this paper focuses on policy-induced
expansions in consumer credit. As a result, while consumer debt dynamics and the banking sector do not
feature in Martins and Skott, they are of prime importance to this paper. Besides, different than Martins
and Skott’s model, the model presented in this paper explicitly considers financial stocks and flows.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section briefly discusses the related literature.
The third section motivates the formal model through a descriptive analysis of key macroeconomic trends
of Turkey between 2002-2018. The third section presents a two-sector open economy model to examine the
structural change ramifications of consumer credit expansions. The final section concludes.
2 Related Literature
The post-Keynesian literature on household debt is of primary relevance to this paper4. However, I depart
from it in three main directions. Firstly, in much of this literature, the expansion in household borrowing
is attributed to a greater demand for consumer borrowing stemming from the deterioration in income dis-
tribution observed in industrialized economies since the early 1980s (e.g., Barba and Pivetti, 2009).5 On
the contrary, in this paper I highlight the changes in banks’ ability and willingness to lend as a key driver
of household credit expansions. In this respect, the specification of debt dynamics has affinities with Dutt
(2006) and Ryoo and Kim (2013).
If borrowers do not wish to go to the limits of credit available to them, the total amount of credit will be
constrained by credit demand (Dutt, 2006). When this is the case, the institutional changes that alter the
supply of credit will be ineffective in stimulating the amount of borrowing; thus, changes in credit conditions
can be explained mainly by the demand-side factors (ibid.) On the contrary, if borrowers are already in
debt up to their credit limits, the total amount of credit will depend primarily on the banks’ willingness and
ability to lend. In the case of Turkey, as will be discussed in the next section, policy induced transformations
in government financing and banking sector in the early 2000s have led to diversification banking activities
towards consumer lending. This transformation has greatly lifted borrowing constraints consumers were
previously subjected to6. Similar policy changes that encouraged the growth of consumer credit was in place
in other developing countries, such as crèdito de nómina loans across Latin America, and requirements on
commercial banks to meet certain targets in mortgage loans in a wide array of countries like Brazil and
Malaysia (Dos Santos, 2013). Therefore, the formal model presented in this paper explains the consumer
credit expansions by changes in banks’ willingness and ability to lend to consumers.
4Palley (1994) and Hein (2012) are two pioneering studies in the post-Keynesian literature on household debt. See Brochier
and Macedo e Silva (2016) for a detailed review of the post-Keynesian literature on household indebtedness and consumption.
5See Pollin (1988), Dutt (2006), and Charpe et al. (2012) for a discussion of whether demand- or supply-side explanations
are more relevant in explaining the growth of household indebtedness. See Stockhammer and Wildauer (2018) for an empirical
examination of different theories on the determinants of household debt.
6According to Başçı (2006), in the period before the 2001-crisis, high real interest rates and budget deficits led Turkish
banks to credit rationing, particularly towards small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and households.
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The second departure from the post-Keynesian literature concerns the need to distinguish between struc-
tural transformation and structural aggregate demand problems, as recently emphasized by Skott (2021) and
Aboobaker and Ugurlu (2020). Economic development represents a process in which the economic struc-
ture moves away from low-productivity sectors towards high-productivity sectors. Concomitantly, structural
change involves the movement of labor from sectors with the lowest to the highest value-added per worker
(Oreiro et al., 2020). Considering that the main obstacle facing developing countries with high levels of open
or hidden unemployment is that of structural transformation (Skott, 2021), this paper aims to highlight the
limitations of overcoming this obstacle through stimulating domestic demand, in this case via expansion of
consumer credit markets.
Finally, given the focus on advanced economies, for which the structural transformation imperatives are
less salient, the post-Keynesian literature on household debt uses single-sector models. However, low- and
middle-income countries are often characterized by dual labor and goods market structures (Razmi, 2015)
meaning that (i) labor constraints have little or no influence on the ability of dual economies to expand
output (Skott, 2021) and (ii) a modern/high-productivity-tradable sector exists alongside a traditional/low-
productivity/nontradable sector7.
The second body of literature this paper relates to empirically links credit expansions with resource misallo-
cations (e.g., Benigno et al., 2015; Borio et al., 2016). This literature shows that credit booms are associated
with labor allocation from high to low productivity sectors. A formal model presented by Benigno and
Fornaro (2014) illustrates that episodes of abundant access to foreign capital and the accompanying credit
expansions result in the allocation of productive sources toward the nontradable sector. In their model, the
expansion of the nontradable sector constitutes a problem because this expansion takes place at the expense
of the tradable sector due to the full employment assumption. In other words, the movement of an already
fully utilized labor into a low-productivity sector lowers the growth potential. The authors motivate their
model through the credit boom Spain experienced during the 2000s. While the full employment assumption
the authors strongly rely on to generate their results may be appropriate for the Spanish economy, its suit-
ability is questionable for dual economies with high levels of un(der)employed labor. Departure from this
assumption is another motivation for the modeling exercise in this paper.
3 Motivation: Consumer Credit Expansion in Turkey
During the 1990s the Turkish economy was marked by chronic inflation, high-interest rates, and unsus-
tainable fiscal deficits. The decade-long macroeconomic volatility and political instability culminated into
a major economic crisis in 2001. The economic management cadres, led by the former Vice President of
the World Bank Kemal Derviş, announced an IMF-supported program, the aforementioned TSE, to combat
the 2001 crisis. This program was fully adopted by the AKP governments and has laid the foundations of
7Empirical findings show that labor productivity grows faster in tradable activities, such as manufacturing, as opposed to
nontradable activities, such as construction and services (e.g., Benigno et al., 2015). Empirical studies also confirm the idea
that structural change and economic growth involve the allocation of resources from low to high productivity sectors (e.g., Diao
et al., 2019.)
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Turkey’s post-2001 growth experience.
The deterioration of the public sector’s fiscal balances amidst the high-interest rate environment was one
of the main drivers of high inflation rates in the 1990s (Voyvoda & Yeldan, 2005). Therefore, disinflation
and fiscal discipline were highlighted as the most important objectives of the TSE program. Attaining
primary fiscal surpluses was seen necessary to restore international investors’ confidence in the economy and
bring inflation under control. With regard to these two objectives, the program was largely successful. The
government budget gave a primary surplus of 6 percent of GDP between 2002-2008, and the inflation rate
was brought down to single digits in 2004, from an average of 77 percent during the 1990s, and it continued
to fluctuate around 8 percent between 2004-2016 (figure 1). The program included other standard IMF















































Figure 1: Inflation Rate
Source: IMF, WEO (April, 2020). Note: The inflation rate is calculated as the annual percentage change in
average consumer prices.
Given its primary objective of achieving fiscal and inflationary discipline, the TSE program aimed at sup-
pressing wage compensation of public sector employers and restructuring income transfer policies. A group of
leading progressive economists organized under the name of ‘Independent Social Scientists Alliance’ (ISSA),
provided a critical assessment of the program where they interpreted these measures as “an attempt creating
surpluses to be channeled into exports” (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2001, p. 15). While some measures aimed
to repress domestic demand, it is nevertheless hard to interpret the program as supporting an export-led
growth strategy given that there was not any roadmap presented to develop the international competitive-
ness of key export industries. Neither has the program presented an industrial strategy to boost investment
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expenditures. As the ISSA critique notes, the word ‘investment’ was used mostly in relation to ‘financial
investment’ by foreigners. The lack of a long-run growth strategy and industrialization targets was this
program’s major weakness.
Despite its non-negligible shortcomings, the TSE program expressed a legitimate concern that commercial
banks were providing too little credit to the private sector given that they were focused on investing in
high-yielding government debt instruments. In fact, up until 2001, commercial banks were earning most of
their revenues from financing the public deficit by purchasing treasury securities (Karaçimen, 2014). There-
fore, as mentioned in the introduction, the TSE program was designed based on the understanding that
contracting public expenditures and limiting commercial banks’ purchase of Treasury securities would direct
bank lending towards private investment and hence automatically crowd-in investment. There was also the
expectation that restoring confidence in international markets and disinflation would enable the reduction
of interest rates, which would stimulate consumption and investment.
Meanwhile, during the 2000s, big corporations decreased their reliance on the domestic banking sector due to
gaining better access to foreign funding, benefiting from the low international interest rates and excess global
liquidity. The appreciation of the Turkish Lira in real terms and fluctuation of the TL/USD nominal rate in
the 1.50-1.90 band between 2002-2013, as shown in figure 2, made foreign borrowing even more attractive.
The end of an era of profiting off high-interest rates on government bonds accompanied by improved macroe-
conomic stability encouraged commercial banks to find new sources for profit generation (Karaçimen, 2014).
As the corporate sector’s reliance on domestic bank loans also decreased, commercial banks turned towards
consumer lending. Banks resorted to various marketing strategies to encourage consumer credit, especially
within the segments of the society that were not used to finance their expenditures through borrowing from
financial institutions (ibid.) As a result, as can be seen from figure 3, the share of household credit as a
percentage of GDP started increasing rapidly from 2001 onward8. Parallel to this, the share of consumer
credit and mortgages increased until 2013, whereas the share of credit allocated to the manufacturing sector
declined secularly (figure 3).
Besides commercial banks’ search for new profit avenues, another significant development that supported
the growth of consumer markets was the entry of foreign banks into the Turkish banking sector, including
some of the biggest global banks such as HSBC and Citibank. The percentage of foreign banks among total
banks increased sharply between 2001 and 20079. Even though foreign banks account only for 12% of the
domestic loan provision (Baskaya et al., 2017, p. 15), increase in foreign ownership of banking have oriented
the Turkish banking sector as a whole towards consumer lending (Ergunes, 2009). The entry of foreign
banks facilitates a turn towards consumer lending due to the technological advantages and the know-how on
8The increase in liabilities of the household sector was not matched by an increase in their assets. As a result, household
leverage ratio increased throughout the 2000s. According to Karaçimen (2014)’s calculations, the ratio of financial liabilities to
assets of the household sector increased from 8.5 to 49 percent between 2003 and 2013 (p.4). The share of interest payments in
households’ disposable income similarly increased from 2.2. percent to 4.9 percent in the same period (ibid.).
9According to the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), as of December 2019, there are 53 banks operating
in the Turkish banking sector, 34 deposit banks, 13 development and investment banks, and six participation banks. Among























































Real Effective Exchange Rate
Figure 2: Exchange Rate
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, Electronic Data Distribution System
consumer lending foreign banks possess. As Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2008) explain, credit scoring meth-
ods require data on the performance of up to 30,000 loans to provide a high degree of statistical confidence.
In recent decades, this requirement favored large global banks, such as Citibank and HSBC, which were
already specialized in consumer lending in their home countries and therefore possessed data from their pool
of previously extended loans. In line with these arguments, figure 3 shows that foreign-owned banks have
been allocating a higher share of their loan portfolio to consumer credit and mortgages than domestic banks.
According to Ergunes (2009), domestic banks, not wanting to lose their market share to foreign-owned banks,
started expanding into consumer credit markets. They adopted aggressive marketing strategies to encourage
credit card use, such as offering installment payment plans, loyalty points, and flier miles (Karaçimen, 2015,
pp. 121-122). Banks were also in a competition to acquire the rights to direct deposit employee salaries
(Karaçimen, 2014, p. 15). Upon reaching an agreement with the employers, banks would offer employees
credit cards and personal loans at favorable interest rates. Similar to the crédito consignado loans in Brazil,
these arrangements between employers, banks, and workers have contributed to consumer credit growth.
The growth of consumer lending was further supported by the intermediation of capital inflows into credit
growth through the banking sector (Orhangazi, 2014; Yilmaz and Suslu, 2016). When credit grows faster
than retail deposits, as has been happening in Turkey, banks turn to alternative funding sources to meet
balance sheet requirements. In the context of the high capital adequacy and liquidity ratios the Turkish
banking sector is subjected to, the increase in non-core liabilities, provided by the international capital
markets, has filled the gap between credits and deposits (Baskaya et al., 2017, p. 16). By providing cheap







































































































































































































Figure 3: Developments in bank credit in Turkey
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Bank Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) & author’s
calculations. Note: All ratios are in percentages.
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international capital markets supported credit expansion in the Turkish banking sector10.
Concerning state interventions and regulations in the banking sector, the literature often comments that
banking regulation in Turkey has been prudent since 2001 thanks to the measures undertaken following
the 2001 crisis. For instance, banks were banned from having currency mismatches, foreign currency loans
to consumers were prohibited, and to firms, it was highly restricted. However, as Hakan Kara, the for-
mer chief economist of the Central Bank, notes the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency lacked a
macroeconomic perspective as it focused exclusively on the health of individual banks (Kara, 2016) without
controlling the composition of credit and the growth of consumer loans. While the upward trend in con-
sumer loans started reversing around 2013 due to the Fed’s tapering signal, the growth of consumer loans
was not addressed by policymakers until March 2020, when the Central Bank introduced a set of changes to
reserve requirements to limit the rise in consumer loans and channel loan supply towards more productive
and production-oriented sectors (CBRT, 2020).
Between 2002-7, the major state interventions in the consumer credit markets took place through parlia-
mentary legislation with the aim of promoting the expansion of mortgage markets (Kahraman, 2017). In the
case of consumer credit (excluding mortgages), the state avoided significant interventions. This choice has
ultimately resulted in an autonomous proliferation of credit card usage (ibid., p.107). On the other hand, the
state played a more active role in promoting the growth of mortgage markets. Before the 2000s, there was
no comprehensive housing finance system that connected financial institutions to home buyers. In 2007, the
parliament enacted the “Housing Finance Law,” which introduced the mortgage system in Turkey, enabling
banks to provide long-term low-interest rate housing credits to consumers. This legislation provided longer
maturity funding opportunities to banks to encourage the growth of mortgage credits. It also allowed the
purchased dwelling units to be used as collateral for loans, including measures to shorten the foreclosure
process in the case of defaults, introduced complementary institutions such as real estate appraisal services,
and defined the legal ground for the introduction of mortgage-back capital market instruments and secondary
market institutions (Erol, 2018, pp. 259-261). The advent of the mortgage system contributed significantly
to the growth of housing loans (Yeşilbağ, 2020).
Any analysis of the growth of consumer lending, particularly mortgage lending, in Turkey would be incom-
plete without discussing the strategic importance assigned to the construction sector during the AKP era.
The AKP governments have made a strategic choice to promote the construction sector due to its ‘potential
to stimulate the economy’, create jobs, and win loyalty at the ballot box through increased homeownership
(Yeşilbağ, 2020). One of the ways by which the government promoted the construction sector’s growth was
to engage in massive construction projects, including Erdoğan’s so-called “crazy project,” which is projected
to split the European side of Istanbul with an artificial canal parallel to Bosporus and opening the idle land
10An empirical study by Baskaya et al. (2017), using bank and firm-level data from Turkey, examines the links between
international capital flows, decomposed into bank and non-bank flows, and domestic credit market. After controlling for
unobserved and time-varying firm characteristics that might be correlated with credit demand, the authors analyze how domestic
banks’ borrowing from international capital markets influence their credit supply. Their findings indicate that large domestic
banks with strong access to international capital markets used cheap borrowing opportunities during periods of low interest
rates in advanced economies, as reflected in their non-core liability ratios.
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around it for construction and rent generation. The rents created in these projects have been successfully
shared between a new generation of construction firms with organic links to the ruling party and the party
officials (Akçay, 2017). It should be highlighted that all the mega projects are in nontradable activities, par-
ticularly construction, and they reveal the sectoral preferences of the government with respect to generating
economic growth (Günçavdı & Ülengin, 2017).
To summarize, the restructuring of macroeconomic policies under an IMF-supported austerity program lim-
ited the government’s ability to stimulate domestic demand through expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.
Consumer credit expansions, enabled and encouraged by the fiscal and banking reforms that were part of
the TSE program and subsequent banking regulations, functioned as a compensation mechanism to fill this
vacuum. Decreasing reliance of the corporate sector on domestic borrowing, the increasing presence of for-
eign banks and strategic importance assigned to the construction sector oriented the banking sector towards
lending to households further11. In the meantime, the banking sector played an active role in intermediating
global financial inflows into domestic credit expansion. These developments resulted in a remarkable increase
in the consumer credit to GDP ratio (figure 3).
One of the natural consequences of the expansion of consumer credit has been high growth rates in final con-
sumption expenditures, excluding the crisis years (figure 4). However, the stimulation of private consumption
expenditures, together with the appreciation of the domestic currency, contributed to the deterioration in
the current account deficit observed since 2001 (figure 4). While current account deficits have been a feature
of the Turkish economy even before the 2000s, particularly since the liberalization of trade and financial
flows in the 1980s, these deficits were usually small (Orhangazi & Yeldan, 2021) and started deteriorating
significantly only after the implementation of the TSE program12.
11While policy induced supply-side drivers are the main focus of this paper, certain demand side factors also contributed to
consumer credit expansions. For instance, decreasing inflation rates and interest rates on consumer loans encouraged consumers
to realize their consumption demands that they had deferred due to the 2001 crisis (Başçı, 2006). The stagnation of real wages
and the dismantling of organized labor, through new labor laws introduced in 2003, contributed to households’ demand for
consumer loans further (Karaçimen, 2014, p. 2)
12The current account deficit to GDP ratio did not exceed one percent throughout the 1990s, it averaged 4.61 percent



















































Current Account Balance to GDP
Figure 4: Consumption Expenditures and Current Account Balance
Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, Electronic Data Distribution System
Despite generating high growth rate during the 2000s (7.2 percent between 2002-2006; figure 5), the con-
sumer credit-fueled growth strategy13 has led to a buildup of imbalances and fragilities, such as balance sheet
fragilities for firms and households, an overvalued real exchange rate, persistent current account deficits, and
sectoral changes favoring low-productivity growth sectors. Most importantly, this growth strategy lacked
a sound industrial policy as short-term gains enabled by an overvalued real exchange rate undermined the
industrial base of the economy in the long run (ibid.). This short-sighted macroeconomic perspective started
running into a crisis following the ‘taper tantrum’ signal by the Fed in 201314, which indicated a change in
global liquidity conditions and led to a major slowdown in capital inflows to emerging markets. As figure 5
illustrates, the GDP growth started exhibiting a declining trend since 2013.
13The conceptualization of Turkey’s growth strategy/model as being credit/debt-led is shared by some other scholars. For
instance, Akçay et al. (2021) , in a study examining the demand regimes of eight emerging capitalist economies, define Turkey’s
growth regime between 2000 and 2019 as “debt-led private demand regime.” According to Akçay et al., the defining character-
istics of this demand regime are (i) “negative or close to zero financial balances of the private household sector”, (ii) positive
financial balances of the external sector (i.e., current account deficits), and (iii) the role of private consumption in driving
growth (p. 6).
14Political tensions that took place starting in this period also posed challenges to the growth strategy that was followed















































Figure 5: GDP Growth
Source: IMF, World Economic Indicators (April 2020)
With regard to sectoral developments, a prolonged period of overvalued real exchange rate, as depicted in
figure 2, promoted the use of imported intermediate goods across many sectors while resulting in the loss of
export competitiveness (ibid.). The end result was a case of premature de-industrialization indicated for in-
stance by the secular increase in the ratio of construction sector output to manufacturing output (figure 6).
The ratio of construction sector value added to GDP increased from 5 to 9 percent between 2002-2013,
whereas the share of manufacturing and services value added fluctuated around 18 percent and 60 percent
respectively. In other words, the production structure of the Turkish economy moved away from tradable
industries towards the nontradable sector (Can et al., 2016). Parallel to these developments, the nontradable
to tradable sector employment increased significantly (figure 6).
Although the primary focus of this paper is on consumer credit markets, developments in the sectoral
composition of firm credit should also be highlighted to explain the expansion of the nontradable sector. The
micro-econometric evidence on Turkey, presented by Günay and Kılınç (2015), shows that the nontradable
sector firms were more financially constrained than the tradable sector ones between 1970 and 2004. This
result is not surprising considering that bank credit is a major source of external finance for nontradable
sector firms, whereas many tradable sector firms have access to international capital markets, given that they
can pledge export receivable as collateral. Therefore, the nontradable sector is more sensitive to changes in
banks’ lending standards than the tradable sector (Tornell and Westermann, 2002). In light of this evidence,
it is possible to interpret the rise of the nontradable sector output, particularly of the construction sector,
















































































































































































NT−sector to T−sector employment
Figure 6: Output and Employment Ratios
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) & author’s calculations
Based on the descriptive account of the Turkish economy presented in this section, the next section will
develop a two-sector open economy model to analyze the macroeconomic and sectoral effects of consumer
credit expansions. One of the key points that need to be captured in the formal model is that consumer
credit expansions were largely policy driven. Secondly, consumer credit expansions were accompanied by
the appreciation of the real exchange rate, deterioration of the current account balance, and the expansion
of the nontradable sector at the expense of the tradable sector.
4 The Model
4.1 Production
The economy under consideration consists of two sectors: a tradable (T-sector) and a nontradable sector (N-
sector). The tradable sector produces output YT using modern production techniques, and labor exhibits high
productivity. The output of this sector can be exported or used for domestic consumption. The production
is characterized by a Leontief production function. The capital coefficient is taken to be constant.
YT = min{σ̄K,ALT } = σK = ALT σ ≤ σ̄ (1)
The nontradable sector produces output YN using labor as the only input. This assumption reflects the
stylized observation that capital intensity is lower in the production of nontradable goods. Equation 2 gives
the production function for the nontradable sector, where e denotes the employment rate in the nontradable
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sector and unemployment, 1− e, can take the form of open or hidden unemployment.
YN = BeLN (2)
Labor is assumed to be mobile across sectors. Workers prefer to be employed in the T-sector, and those who
cannot find jobs in the T-sector move into the N-sector.
L = LT + LNT (3)
Using equation 3, equation 2 can be re-written as:
YN = BeLN = Be(L− LT ) = BeL(1−
σK
AL
) = BeL(1− σλ) (4)





4.2 Wages and Prices
Nominal wages in the T-sector, wT , are predetermined. Assuming a constant mark-up, prices in the T-sector
are also predetermined. Therefore, profit share is given by:
π = 1− wT
ApT
(6)
The nontradable sector is characterized by income/work sharing15. The average income (wage) in the N-






While aggregate income in the N-sector is demand determined, whether the increase pNYN results from an
increase in pN or YN is indeterminate. A higher demand for N-goods can i) increase pN , ii) reduce the
rate of unemployment and raise YN , iii) or some combination of two might take place. Regardless of the
specific channel by which a higher demand for N-goods translates into a higher pNYN , an increase in N-sector
incomes would result in wage inflation in the T-sector if workers in this sector respond to higher average
incomes in the N-sector by demanding an increase in their wages.
Following Martins and Skott (2021), the specification for wage inflation in the T-sector incorporates relative





− 1), f(0) = 0, f ′ > 0 (8)
15Income sharing is a common assumption employed in dual economy models. See, for instance, Razmi et al. (2012).
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where wO is the target (objective) wage rate of T-sector workers, which is proportional to average income in
the N-sector (equation 9). The target level of wage can be interpreted in relation to the norms of fairness.
Equation 9 shows that the target wage rate in the T-sector is higher than average incomes in the N-sector
(µ > 1). Firms can be expected to pay a wage premium under the standard rationales of efficiency wage
theory (Martins and Skott, 2021). The non-negative wage premium is also a common assumption in dual
sector models in the tradition of Lewis (1954)16.
wO = µwN , µ > 1 (9)
4.3 Banking Behaviour and Debt Dynamics
A skeletal banking system is assumed. All foreign (net) capital inflows take the form of changes in foreign
held deposits in domestic banks. All foreign deposits are held in domestic currency. Domestic firms are
owned by capitalists, who also receive interest income on their bank deposits. Equation 10 shows that total
loans, divided into loans given to workers and capitalist, and deposits, by foreigners and capitalists, are
equal, which means that banks have no reserves. With interest rates on borrowing and lending are being
the same17, banks have zero profits. Accounting relations on the model are summarized in table 1.
Dw +DC = MF +MC (10)
Workers take on debt for consumption purposes whereas capitalists borrow to finance investment spend-
ing18. Firms’/capitalists’ finance constraint is given by equation 11. This equation suggests that for capital
accumulation to exceed internal funds and interest income net of interest payments on debt, and deposits,
it needs to be financed by new borrowing.
pKI = s(πpTYT − iDC + iMC) + ḊC − ṀC (11)
A key assumption of the model is that workers are subject to credit rationing; therefore, consumer credit
expansions are explained by changes in banks’ willingness and ability to lend to households. There are no
constraints on total amount of loans that can be borrowed by firms. Equation 12 expresses the change in
workers’ debt as a function of the target level of lending (to workers) as determined by banks, DT , and
actual stock of workers’ debt, Dw, where θ is a positive constant. This specification of debt dynamics has
16Formulating a target wage rate shares affinities with the post-Keynesian conflicting claims theory of inflation (Rowthorn,
1977). In this theory, the general price level comprises various cost components whereby each interest group receiving income
from these components comes into conflict to increase their relative income shares. Given the assumption of constant labor
productivity employed in this paper, we can think of demanding a desired functional distribution versus a desired real wage
as being the same. It should also be noted that besides the N-sector wages, the employment rate in the T-sector is likely to
influence the target wage rate as it shapes workers’ perceptions of their bargaining power (Porcile & Lima, 2010). However,
this paper abstains from this aspect of wage setting to keep the formal analysis easily tractable.
17Credit rationing suggests that banks find lending to households risky, and they expect some households to default. As
such, it might be unreasonable to expect the interest rates on lending and borrowing to be the same. We could introduce an
interest rate spread; however, qualitative results would not change as long as banks are owned by domestic capitalists, and any
profits are paid out to them as dividends. This is because whether capitalists earn interest income on their deposits or earn
dividend income does not change their consumption behavior.
18For this reason, the terms ‘workers’ debt’ and ‘consumer debt’ are used interchangeably.
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some affinities with Dutt (2006) and Ryoo and Kim (2013).
ḊW = θ(DT −Dw) (12)
The target level of lending reflects banks’ willingness and ability to give consumer loans. As explained in
section 3, the policy induced transformations in government financing and banking sector in Turkey in the
aftermath of the 2001 crisis have led to diversification banking activities towards consumer lending. Changes
in the target level of lending towards consumer reflect this sort of policy-induced increases in borrowing
opportunities faced by consumers.
The change in foreign deposits is given by equation 13.
ṀF = iMF −NX (13)
With regard to central banking behavior, I assume that the central bank adopts an inflation-targeting
framework, where interest rate is used as a tool to keep inflation under control. As such, whenever there is
an upward pressure on the general price level, the central bank increases the interest rate to keep inflation
at a targeted rate. This assumption is in line with the central banking practices most developing countries,
including Turkey, have adopted since the early 2000s.
Workers Capitalists Banks External Total
Fixed Capital pKK pKK
Loans −DW −DC DW +DC 0
Deposits +MC −MC −MF MF 0
Sum −DW pKK −DC +MC DW +DC −MC −MF MF pKK
Table 1: Balance Sheet Matrix
4.4 Demand
Aggregate consumption is divided into three components: i) demand for domestically produced tradable
goods, ii) demand for nontradable goods, and iii) demand for foreign produced tradable goods. All nontrad-
able income is spent on consumption. Similarly, wage earners in the T-sector consume all their earnings plus
their borrowing, represented by ḊW , net of interest payments on their total stock of debt. In line with the
standard structuralist and Kaleckian literature, I assume that capitalists save a fraction of s of total profits,
πYT , where π denotes the profit share. Capitalists spend a proportion of their profit income plus their net
interest earnings, on consumption.
pC = pNCN +pTCT +np
∗CIM = pNYN +(1− π)pTYT + ḊW − iDW +(1− s)(πpTYT − iDC + iMC) (14)
Each of the three goods receive a fixed share of total domestic spending on consumption, corresponding to
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a Cobb-Douglas utility function19. Equations 15-17 show that a proportion α of total consumption demand
goes to nontradable goods, while the rest 1− α goes to the tradable goods. The demand for tradable goods
is divided between domestically and foreign produced goods, with shares 1− ψ and ψ respectively.
pNCN = αpC (15)
pTCT = (1− ψ)(1− α)pC (16)
np∗CIM = ψ(1− α)pC (17)
The nominal exchange rate, n, is defined as the number of units of domestic currency required to buy one unit
of foreign currency. Hence, an increase in n corresponds to a depreciation of the domestic currency. Following
Martins and Skott’s (2021) formalization that relies on standard interest parity arguments, the nominal
exchange rate is represented as a function of domestic interest rate, foreign interest rate, expectations of future
exchange rate, and risk considerations that are independent of exchange rate expectations (equation 18).
The expected exchange rate and the risk premium can change in response to any domestic or international
macroeconomic shock. Foreign prices, p∗, are taken as exogenous.
n = n(i, i∗, En, τ) (18)






n(i, i∗, En, τ)p∗
pT




By subsuming τ , i∗, En, and p
∗
pT
into the shift variable ρ, the real exchange rate is given by equation 19.
η = η (i, ρ) ; ηi < 0, ηρ > 0 (19)
Investment requires both domestic tradable goods and imported goods, with strict complementarity20. Real







Nominal investment is given by:
pKI = [βpT + (1− β)np∗]I (21)
19The assumption of fixed consumption shares is a reasonable approximation for the short and medium run (Skott & Gómez-
Ramı́rez, 2018). However, a long run extension of the model would need to relax this assumption (see, e.g., Razmi et al., 2012).
Section 4.7 discusses the implications of relaxing this assumption.
20In the model, while domestically produced and imported goods are substitutes in consumption, they are complements in
investment. This assumption is a stylized representation where the home country is importing sophisticated investment goods,
such as machinery and equipment, that are essential but cannot be produced domestically.
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Investment behavior is given by equation 22 with output-capital ratio, which is used as an indicator of
capacity utilization, being the only argument. The sensitivity of investment to changes in utilization, given
by a1, is likely to depend on the time frame under consideration. Given that the sensitivity is likely to be
low in the short run, I assume that the Keynesian stability condition is satisfied in the short run, meaning
that the saving rate responds more to changes in the capacity utilization than investment.
I
K
= a+ a1σ (22)
Equation 23 shows that exports depend positively on the real exchange rate. The effect of foreign income
on exports is omitted. Net exports are given by equation 24 where imported goods used for investment and
consumption of imported tradable goods are deducted from exports.
pTX = pTφ (η) , φ
′ (η) > 0 (23)
NX = pTX − np∗(1− β)I − ψ(1− α)pC (24)
4.5 Equilibrium
Using equations 4, 14 and 15, the equilibrium condition for the N-sector can be expressed as:
pNYN = pNBeL (1− σλ) = pNCN = αpC (25)
With a fixed mark-up, a successful inflation targeting requires a constant wage inflation. This in turn requires
that 1) the actual wage in the T-sector is equal to the target wage, and 2) there is a fixed relationship between
the wages in the two sectors. These two conditions can be summarized as:
wT = w
O = µwN (26)
Using equations 6, 7, and 26, equation 25 can be solved for T-sector output-capital ratio, which is given by





























Equation 27a expresses the value of σ that is consistent with the assumption of constant inflation as a
function of ḊW , i and a set of exogenous and predetermined variables. Looking at the partial derivatives,
we can establish that this equation expresses σ as an increasing function of i and as a decreasing function of





= 0 G1 > 0, G2 < 0, G3 > 0 (27b)
So far, we have looked at the equilibrium condition for the N-sector. We also need to take the equilibrium
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condition for the T-sector, which is given by:
pTYT = pTCT + pT IT + pTXT = (1− ψ)(1− α)pC + pTβI + pTφ(η) (28)
Solving this equation for output-capital ratio yields (see appendix B for intermediate steps):
σ =
1


















Equation 29a expresses σ as a decreasing function of i and an increasing function of ḊW . This equation can





= 0 H1 > 0, H2 > 0, H3 < 0 (29b)
We now have two equations (equation 27b and 29b) that we can use to determine the two endogenous
variables of the model, σ and i.
4.6 Comparative Statics
The effects of household credit expansion on tradable sector output
The partial derivative of equilibrium value of σ (represented by σ∗) with respect to ḊW is negative provided
that i) the real exchange rate is interest elastic, and ii) Marshall-Lerner condition holds (see appendix C for




Intuitively, when there is new borrowing by households, the total consumption demand increases, a portion
α of which feeds into the N-sector. Higher demand for N-goods translates into an increase in pNYN , repre-
senting an increase in the average incomes in this sector. Given that the target wage rate in the T-sector
exceeds average incomes in the N-sector (i.e., µ > 0), an increase in N-sector average incomes puts upward
pressure on T-sector wages. With mark-up pricing, wage pressures in the T-sector translate into inflationary
pressures. Under an inflation targeting framework, the central bank would raise the interest rate to contain
the rise in domestic prices. This intervention causes an appreciation of the nominal, and hence the real
exchange rate (η falls, equation 19). This results in a reduction in exports. As a result, the tradable sector
output shrinks.
The effects of household credit expansion on nontradable sector output
From equation 4, we have: pNYN = pNBeL (1− σλ). Given the constancy of pNe, B, L and λ, we can see
that pNYN would unambiguously increase as an increase in Ḋ
W causes σ to decline, as given by equation
27.
The effects of household credit expansion on net exports
Net exports were given by:
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NX = pTX − np∗(1− β)I − ψ(1− α)pC
= pTφ (η)− np∗ (1− β)K (a+ a1σ)− ψ(1− α)pC
Without restrictions on some of the parameters, the net effect on net exports appears to be ambiguous. The
effect of a rise in ḊW is likely to be negative for small values of β, if the sensitivity of accumulation to
changes in output (a1) is high, and the share of consumption going to imported tradable goods is high.
Before concluding the formal analysis, it should be noted that this set up is stock-flow consistent in the sense
that the balance sheet condition for the banking sector is maintained over time for any value of ḊW by the
financial flows that the model determines (i.e., ṀF + ṀC = ḊW + ḊC). (See appendix D for a formal
proof.)
4.7 Discussion
The model presented above captures five key developments that are documented in section 3. It shows that
1) policy changes that increase banks’ willingness and ability to lend trigger expansions in consumer credit.
New consumer lending, in turn, accompanies 2) appreciation of the real exchange rate, 3) deterioration of
the current account balance, 4) a decline in the T-sector output, and 5) an increase in the N-sector output.
The model generates these results in a short-run setting. However, an analysis of structural transforma-
tion necessitates a long-run perspective. As the proceeding qualitative analysis shows, several factors point
that the adverse effects of consumer credit expansions on the T-sector are likely to strengthen in the long run.
To analyze the long-run implications, we can first discuss how investment behavior would be expected to
change in the long run. If we take an Harrodian perspective, we can expect deviations between the actual
and the desired utilization rate due to the slow nature of adjustments in capital stock in the short run.
However, in the long run, firms target a desired utilization rate compatible with their profit maximization
goal. As a result, they adjust their capital accumulation when there are under or over-utilized capacities.
If firms have persistent unwanted excess capacity, they will react by reducing investment. In terms of the
formal model presented in this paper, taking the Harrodian dynamics into account suggests that a contrac-
tion in T-sector capacity utilization might affect investment much more dramatically than suggested by the
short-run specification as firms react to the shrinking divergence between the actual and targeted rate of
utilization by decreasing their investment further.
Changes in labor productivity is another aspect that requires attention in the long run. The model presented
above assumed a fixed coefficient production function for the T-sector. While this choice is reasonable in
the short-run, labor productivity would be expected to depend positively on the rate of accumulation (i.e.,
the growth rate of output in the T-sector) in the medium to long-run, corresponding to the Verdoorn effect.
This suggests that when productivity gains are taken into consideration, consumer credit expansion could
result in a fall in labor productivity in the T-sector through a lower accumulation rate. Furthermore, if
increasing returns to scale is introduced in the T-sector, consumer credit expansions could push an economy
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into a deindustrialization trap21.
Another assumption that would need to be relaxed for a long-run analysis is the assumption of constant
consumption shares. The model assumed that households spend a constant proportion of their income on
domestically and foreign-produced tradable goods, with shares 1− ψ and ψ respectively. In the medium to
long run, these shares likely respond to changes in the real exchange rate, whereby households spend a greater
proportion of their income on imported tradable goods following an appreciation. Once this effect is taken
into consideration, the effect of consumer credit expansion on the current account deficit is likely to be larger.
The analysis so far has abstained from imported intermediate inputs to keep the formal model tractable.
Nevertheless, a few remarks can still be made. Whether incorporation of intermediate inputs alters the
model’s conclusions or not depends on how RER appreciation generated by household credit expansion
affects the constant inflation constraint. The RER appreciation would lower the general price level by cheap-
ening imported consumption goods and non-labor input costs. With fixed mark-up, the decline in the price
level would translate into a larger wage share. However, if the proportion of wages in the two sectors do not
change (i.e., if wages in the two sectors increase by the same proportion following the appreciation), then
the introduction of intermediate inputs would not be expected to change the qualitative results of the model
given that the central bank does not change its policy rate in the case of a constant wage inflation.
Another key factor that is likely to worsen the long-run implications is the balance of payments effects. The
boost to aggregate demand, coupled with the real exchange rate appreciation, is likely to trigger unsustain-
able trade deficits and drag economic growth. Sustained appreciation of the RER could have additional
detrimental consequences in the long run if it changes the incentive structure of domestic producers by mak-
ing them more reliant on imported inputs; hence, making the balance of payments constraint more binding.
In other words, even if RER appreciation could dampen inflation and raise living standards in the short run,
it can alter the incentive structures of producers and deteriorate the balance of payments over the long-run.
5 Conclusion
This paper aimed to present a two-sector open economy growth model to analyze how policy-induced expan-
sions in consumer credit can generate premature deindustrialization when borrowing constraints consumers
were previously subjected to are lifted and an inflation-targeting regime is in place. The model is inspired by
the Turkish economy, which has experienced a significant increase in consumer credit to GDP ratio between
2002 and 2019. Changes in the fiscal policy and the banking sector after the 2001 economic crisis, cou-
pled with favorable international financial conditions, oriented the Turkish banking sector towards consumer
lending. Although credit-financed consumption contributed to high growth rates in the short-run through
stimulating domestic aggregate demand, this process was accompanied by the build-up of several imbalances,
such as the appreciation of the real exchange rate, expansion of the current account deficit, and deterioration
21This argument shares affinities with the literature on resource curse. See Skott (2021) for a formalization of how a
temporary oil boom can lead to permanent deindustrialization. Benigno et al. (2015) make a case for “financial resource curse”
in the case of abundant access to foreign capital coupled with weak productivity growth.
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of the sectoral structure.
While the literature on consumer debt has proliferated in recent years, there have not been any attempts to
evaluate the implications of credit-financed consumption in dual economies using a formal model. The lack
of attention given to developing countries in the post-Keynesian literature on consumer debt, coupled with
the need to evaluate the weaknesses of credit-fueled growth strategies, motivated the modelling exercise in
this paper. The main contribution of this paper hence lies in the development of a dual economy model that
depicts a specific mechanism by which consumer credit expansions can generate undesirable macroeconomic
and sectoral outcomes in countries with high levels of un(der)employed labor.
The paper also aimed to present a critique of the short-termism of growth strategies Turkey adopted in recent
decades. The political economy analysis of post-2001’s Turkey indicates that credit-financed consumption,
coupled with nontradable sector investments and overvalued currency, was used as populist measures by the
AKP governments to generate short-term economic gains and political support. The formal model presented
in this paper illustrated that such populist measures are not compatible with successful industrialization.
Future policy ought to be structured around a different set of premises if Turkey is to realize a more sus-
tainable development path.
Before ending the paper, a few caveats should also be mentioned. Firstly, the financial side of the model
is kept relatively simple. The model does not distinguish between different types of capital inflows, such
as bond flows or equity flows. Financial inflows take the form of changes in deposits held by foreigners in
domestic banks. Examining how domestic credit expansion interact with different types of capital inflows
can be a helpful direction for future research22. Meanwhile, foreign currency-denominated assets and lia-
bilities in the balance sheet of the banking sector are assumed away. Therefore, the model does not allow
to examine balance sheet mismatches in the banking sector that could arise from movements in the real
exchange rate. Secondly, the model does not feature credit constraints faced by firms. However, as discussed
in section three, the empirical evidence on Turkey indicates that SMEs, particularly those operating in the
nontradable sector, face borrowing constraints (Günay & Kılınç, 2015). Future formal modeling exercises
could take these asymmetries into consideration. Fiscal policy and industrial policy are not incorporated
into the model23.
Finally, it should be noted that while the formal model is inspired by the Turkish experience, its conclusions
apply to other developing countries that underwent significant expansions in household credit and prema-
ture deindustrialization. The general policy conclusions that can be drawn from this paper, which echoes
Martins and Skott (2021), is that aggregate demand policy should focus on creating a stable macroeconomic
environment that encourages and supports the expansion of high-productivity activities, which are typically
associated with the tradable sector, without undermining productive capacity and causing unsustainable
imbalances, particularly with respect to real exchange rate alignment and balance of payments.
22See Razmi (2016, 2021) for an analysis of how different types of capital inflows interact with macroeconomic and sectoral
outcomes under different exchange rate regimes using the Portfolio Balance Framework.
23See Skott (2021) for a discussion of fiscal policy in a dual economy.
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Appendix A: Nontradable sector equilibrium
pNYN = pNBeL (1− σλ) = pNCN = αpC (A1)
Solving equation 25 (A1) for tradable sector output-capital ratio yields:
pNYN = α
[
pNYN + (1− π)pTYT + ḊW − iDW + (1− s)(πpTYT − iDC + iMC)
]
(A2)
Re-arranging the terms and using equation 10:
(1− α) pNYN = α
[








(1− sπ)pTYT + ḊW − siDW − (1− s) iMF
]
(A4)


























































As previously states in section 4.5, with a fixed mark-up, a successful inflation targeting requires a constant
wage inflation. This in turn requires that 1) the actual wage in the T-sector is equal to the target wage,
and 2) there is a fixed relationship between the wages in the two sectors. These two conditions can be
summarized as:
wT = w
O = µwN (A7)



























































Appendix B: Tradable sector equilibrium
pTYT = pTCT + pT IT + pTXT = (1− ψ)(1− α)pC + pTβI + pTφ(η) (B1)
Inserting pC from equation 14:
pTYT = (1− ψ) (1− α)
[
pNYN + (1− sπ) pTYT + ḊW − siDW − (1− s) iMF
]
+ pTβI + pTφ (B2)
Dividing both sides of this equation with pTK:




















From equation 15, we have:
pNYN = pNCN = αpC = α
[







(1− sπ) pTYT + ḊW − siDW − (1− s) iMF
]
(B5)
Inserting this equation into the expression for σ:





























Rearranging the terms yields:
σ =
1


















Appendix C: Comparative Statics
To find the partial derivative of σ with respect to ḊW , let’s first take the total derivatives of equation 27b
and 29b. These are given by:
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G1dσ +G2di +G3dḊW = 0 (C1)
H1dσ +H2di +H3dḊW = 0 (C2)
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−G3 H2+ H3 G2
1
G1 H2− H1 G2
(C5)
To establish the sign of dσdḊW
, we need to establish whether −G3 H2 +H3G2 is less then, equal to, or greater










































































































In other words, as long as the interest elasticity of the real exchange rate is greater than zero, and the
exchange rate elasticity of exports is negative (i.e., a real exchange rate appreciates causes a decline in




Appendix D: Stock-Flow Consistency
In the model, we assumed that total loans, divided into loans given to workers and capitalists, are equal to
total deposits, which are held by foreigners and capitalists. For the model to be stock-flow consistent, we
need to ensure that this balance sheet condition is maintained over time, i.e.,
ṀF + ṀC = ḊC + ḊW (D1)
We can use the IS equation, capitalists’/firms’ finance constraint, and equation defining ṀF , all reproduced
below, to check whether equation D1 holds.
The IS equation:
pNYN + pTYT = pNCN + pTCT + βpT I + pTX (D2)
Capitalists’/firms’ finance constraint:
pKI = s(πpTYT − iDC + iMC) + ḊC − ṀC (D3)
Change in foreign deposits:
ṀF = iMF −NX (D4)
From equation D4 and 24, pTX is given by:
pTX = Ṁ
F − iMF − np∗CIM − (1− β)np∗I (D5)
From equation 14, we have
pNCN + pTCT = pNYN + (1− π)pTYT + ḊW − iDW + (1− s)(πpTYT − iDC + iMC)− np∗CIM (D6)
From equation 21 and equation A3, βpT I is given by:
βpT I = s(πpTYT − iDC + iMC) + ḊC − ṀC − (1− β)np∗I (D7)
Inserting equation D4, D5, and D6 into the IS equation, we have:
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pNYN + pTYT = pNYN + (1− π)pTYT + ḊW − iDW + (1− s)(πpTYT − iDC + iMC)
−np∗CIM + s(πpTYT − iDC + iMC) + ḊC −ṀC − (1−β)np∗I+ṀF − iMF −np∗CIM − (1−β)np∗I (D8)
Using the assumption that DW +DC = MF +MC and simplifying equation D8 yields:
ṀF + ṀC = ḊC + ḊW (D9)
Hence the model is stock-flow consistent.
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